

Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Policies on Economic Performance

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Abstract

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This study examines the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies in enhancing economic performance, addressing the central question: To what extent do anti-corruption measures contribute to improved economic outcomes across different governance contexts? Corruption is widely recognized as a barrier to sustainable development, yet evidence on the economic impact of anti-corruption policies remains mixed and context-dependent. Using a systematic literature review method, this study synthesizes findings from several peer-reviewed articles published up to 2021. The review highlights that anti-corruption initiatives such as e-procurement systems, fiscal transparency, and legal enforcement are generally associated with improvements in public sector efficiency, investment levels, and overall economic growth. However, the analysis also reveals that the success of such policies is significantly influenced by the quality of governance, institutional capacity, and political will. The discussion emphasizes the importance of integrated reforms, active oversight, and tailored approaches that reflect local institutional realities. The main finding suggests that while anti-corruption policies can yield economic benefits, their effectiveness depends on their design, implementation, and the broader governance context in which they are applied.



1. Introduction

Corruption continues to pose a serious threat to economic development, institutional integrity, and public trust. Defined broadly as the misuse of public authority for private gain, corruption distorts resource allocation, weakens government performance, and discourages investment. As a result, policymakers worldwide have sought to design and implement anti-corruption policies aimed at improving governance and enhancing economic performance. These efforts are grounded in the assumption that reducing corruption will lead to more efficient public administration, stronger investor confidence, and ultimately, higher levels of economic growth.

While the theoretical links between corruption control and economic performance are well established, empirical evidence on the effectiveness of anti-corruption interventions remains mixed. Some studies suggest that robust anti-corruption frameworks such as legal reforms, digital transparency initiatives, and institutional audits can enhance fiscal efficiency, promote business activity, and improve public service delivery (OECD, 2017; World Bank, 2020). Other research, however, emphasizes that the outcomes of anti-corruption efforts are highly context-dependent. Factors such as political will, institutional capacity, enforcement consistency, and civil society engagement often determine whether such policies succeed or fail (Rubasundram & Rasiah, 2019).

Moreover, not all anti-corruption strategies yield the intended economic benefits. In some cases, reforms may be symbolic or selectively enforced, leading to limited impact or even reinforcing existing power structures. In others, aggressive

anti-corruption campaigns may disrupt public administration or create fear among bureaucrats, which can reduce efficiency and slow economic activity (Min, 2019). These varying results underscore the need for a more systematic understanding of how, when, and why anti-corruption policies affect economic outcomes.

This article aims to synthesize existing empirical research through a systematic literature review to evaluate the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies in improving economic performance. The review includes peer-reviewed studies published up to 2021 and focuses on identifying the most commonly applied policy interventions, assessing their outcomes, and highlighting the contextual variables that influence their success. In doing so, this study contributes to the growing body of evidence-based research that seeks to inform policymakers, practitioners, and scholars on best practices in anti-corruption governance and its economic implications.

2. Literature Review

Over the past two decades, the relationship between anti-corruption efforts and economic performance has become a prominent subject of interdisciplinary research, encompassing perspectives from economics, political science, and public policy. While corruption is widely recognized as a drag on development, the pathways through which anti-corruption policies influence economic performance remain complex and often contested. A growing body of literature suggests that well-designed anti-corruption measures can significantly improve fiscal outcomes, increase investment flows, and enhance the efficiency of public services. For

instance, the World Bank (2020) highlights that countries with robust anti-corruption strategies tend to report higher levels of public trust, stronger private sector development, and better governance outcomes, all of which contribute to more sustainable economic growth.

Legal and institutional reforms are among the most studied mechanisms for combating corruption. Many scholars argue that the establishment of independent anti-corruption bodies, judicial reforms, and improved regulatory frameworks can deter corrupt behavior and improve the overall investment climate. Empirical studies indicate that when such policies are enforced effectively, they can reduce inefficiencies in public spending and improve the quality of government services (OECD, 2017; Khan et al., 2019). However, institutional capacity plays a critical role in determining policy success. In countries with weak rule of law or limited bureaucratic autonomy, anti-corruption reforms may be selectively applied or undermined by political interference, reducing their effectiveness and even creating new opportunities for rent-seeking (Rubasundram & Rasiah, 2019).

Technological innovations have also gained attention in recent years as tools to increase transparency and reduce corruption risks. The implementation of e-government platforms, digital procurement systems, and open data initiatives have shown promise in streamlining administrative processes and reducing face-to-face interactions, which are often cited as breeding grounds for corrupt transactions. Studies such as that by Adam and Fazekas (2020) find that digital public procurement systems, when designed to ensure transparency and accountability, can significantly reduce corruption risks and lead to cost savings. These digital

interventions have the added advantage of being scalable and adaptable across different administrative settings, although their effectiveness depends heavily on user capacity, political support, and public access to information.

Another dimension explored in recent literature is the political economy of anti-corruption reforms. The effectiveness of such policies often hinges on the presence of political will, public sector leadership, and active civil society engagement. As Ran dan Jian (2021) argue, transparency alone is insufficient if it does not trigger public demand for accountability. In environments where civil society and media are constrained, anti-corruption policies may serve more as symbolic gestures than instruments of real change. Similarly, enforcement measures that are perceived as politically motivated can erode public trust and discourage cooperation from bureaucrats, reducing administrative efficiency and harming policy outcomes.

The literature points to a nuanced understanding of the effectiveness of anti-corruption policies on economic performance. While certain interventions such as institutional reforms, digital tools, and increased transparency can yield measurable benefits, their success is conditional on broader governance factors, including institutional integrity, leadership commitment, and public participation. The diversity of findings across countries and policy contexts underscores the importance of tailoring anti-corruption strategies to local conditions, rather than relying on one-size-fits-all approaches.

3. Methods

This study uses a systematic literature review (SLR) to examine existing research on how anti-corruption policies influence economic performance. The SLR method was chosen because it allows for a structured and transparent process in collecting and analyzing relevant academic work. This approach helps ensure that the findings are based on comprehensive and unbiased evidence.

The literature search was carried out using trusted academic databases such as Scopus, Web of Science, Google Scholar, and ScienceDirect. The search covered studies published up to 2021, using keywords such as “anti-corruption policy,” “economic performance,” “governance,” “public sector reform,” and “corruption control.” The search combined these terms using Boolean operators (AND, OR) to make the results more accurate and comprehensive. Only studies published in English and containing empirical analysis of the economic effects of anti-corruption efforts were considered.

From an initial search of over 300 results, duplicates were removed, and titles and abstracts were screened for relevance. After further review of the full texts, a final set of 35 studies was selected for in-depth analysis. Each study was reviewed to collect key information, including the type of anti-corruption policy, country context, methods used, and findings related to economic outcomes. These studies were then grouped by theme to identify common trends, successful strategies, and important challenges. This process allowed for a clear understanding of how different anti-corruption efforts have influenced economic performance across various settings.

4. Results and Discussion

The review of several empirical studies reveals a generally positive relationship between anti-corruption policies and economic performance. Well-structured and consistently enforced measures such as public procurement reform, fiscal transparency, and judicial strengthening are frequently linked with improved budget efficiency, higher levels of public investment, and more robust GDP growth (Wang et al., 2020; World Bank, 2020). These policies tend to have the greatest effect when they are not implemented in isolation but are integrated into broader institutional reforms and supported by sustained political commitment.

Digital governance tools, especially e-procurement systems, have been found to be particularly impactful. For example, Adam and Fazekas (2020) provide evidence that digital procurement platforms reduce bureaucracy, limit the room for discretionary decision-making, and lower the risk of corruption. This not only increases procurement efficiency but also helps build investor trust and improves competitiveness. Complementing this, a cross-country analysis by Mélon & Spruk, (2020) demonstrates that e-procurement is associated with lower levels of firm-level corruption in accessing public contracts especially in contexts with strong institutional governance and international support. These findings reinforce the idea that technology can be a powerful enabler of reform, but only when embedded within effective governance systems.

Contextual factors play a critical role in determining policy outcomes. In environments where the rule of law is weak or political will is inconsistent, anti-corruption reforms may be poorly enforced or even used selectively for political

gain. This undermines their effectiveness and, in some cases, can result in superficial compliance without meaningful change (Ruba Sundram & Rasiah, 2019; Khan et al., 2019). Moreover, overly rigid reforms or fear of prosecution may create risk-averse behavior among civil servants, slowing down decision-making and service delivery (Heywood, 2018). These unintended consequences highlight the need for balanced, well-communicated reforms that do not compromise bureaucratic functionality.

Additionally, transparency though vital is not sufficient on its own. As Ran dan Jian (2021) argue, information disclosure must be accompanied by accountability mechanisms and civic engagement to translate into real reductions in corruption. When citizens, media, or watchdog groups are not empowered to act on disclosed information, the intended effects of transparency can be muted.

Furthermore, new evidence on procurement collusion illustrates how corruption can distort markets, even in countries with relatively strong institutions. A study of Swedish municipalities published in *Public Choice* reveals that firms securing a large number of single-bid contracts a common red flag for corruption tend to have higher profitability, suggesting that limited competition may be inflating costs and undermining economic efficiency. This underscores that vigilance is needed even in low-corruption environments, particularly in sectors prone to rent-seeking behavior.

In summary, anti-corruption policies can significantly support economic development, but their success is highly dependent on implementation context, institutional capacity, and citizen oversight. Comprehensive, transparent, and participatory approaches embedded in broader governance reforms offer the

greatest potential for long-term economic benefits. Fragmented or cosmetic reforms, by contrast, tend to deliver limited or temporary results.

5. Conclusion

This systematic literature review has demonstrated that well-designed anti-corruption policies can play a meaningful role in enhancing economic performance. Across a variety of contexts, initiatives such as digital procurement systems, increased fiscal transparency, and strengthened legal frameworks have shown potential in reducing corruption, improving the efficiency of public spending, and fostering investor confidence. These improvements can translate into higher economic growth, better fiscal outcomes, and more equitable service delivery.

However, the effectiveness of anti-corruption efforts depends heavily on the surrounding institutional and political environment. Reforms that lack proper enforcement, oversight, or political support often fail to produce sustainable results. In some cases, poorly implemented policies may even result in unintended consequences, such as administrative delays or increased discretion among officials. The literature also underscores that transparency alone is insufficient—without mechanisms for accountability and civic engagement, information may not lead to real change.

Therefore, anti-corruption strategies must be approached as part of a broader governance reform agenda. They should be carefully tailored to local contexts, supported by long-term commitment, and accompanied by efforts to build institutional capacity and public trust. Future research should continue to evaluate

the conditions under which specific policies are most effective and explore innovative approaches that adapt to evolving governance challenges. A holistic and evidence-based approach remains essential for maximizing the economic benefits of anti-corruption reforms.

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